Archil Gamzardia: Gov’t may use October opposition rally as pretext to intensify crackdown on protests

It depends on how the events of 4 October unfold. If the authorities provoke incidents - which is possible - they could then use this as a pretext to crack down on the opposition, Gamzardia said

Author
Front News Georgia
Recent political developments, particularly the arrests within the ruling party, suggest there is serious internal conflict within Georgian Dream. Archil Gamzardia, a Doctor of Political Philosophy, told Front News the situation may be driven by several possible factors. One key theory points to financial interests and clan rivalries, where the redistribution of financial flows fuels conflict. Another suggests the government may be trying to create an image of fighting corruption to win public approval, and it is not excluded that the actions could also be aimed at improving relations with the incoming US administration.
Q: Recent arrests have revealed serious internal conflict within the ruling party. The opposition even speculates that the government might be planning to arrest former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. What kind of process are we witnessing, how damaging is this for the country, and how might it affect the ruling party’s electorate?
A: Of course, this sets a very bad precedent and it will inevitably harm the country. Everything happening now, both internally and externally, is not beneficial for Georgia. As for the internal conflict, there could be several reasons. The most standard - and I think the most realistic - explanation is clan-based rivalries, especially over financial interests. With this type of power, money flows freely, and no one wants one group to monopolize it. It seems autonomous financial resources have emerged within the system.
The second version, for me, is that this may be a simulation - an attempt by the government to manage its reputation domestically. The Georgian Dream may be trying to benefit from this situation and create the impression that it is fighting corruption. There is a widespread public perception that the government is corrupt, so this might be an effort to counter that. I also suspect these moves could be aimed at showing the new US administration that they are addressing corruption. I’ve heard the US has made some critical statements about financial flows in Georgia, so it’s plausible they are trying to impress the [Donald] Trump administration.
Q: Why has speculation emerged that Garibashvili might be cooperating with the opposition? He has even been linked to Levan Khabeishvili [the United National Movement opposition leader], with claims that Khabeishvili may have received information from him or from other former Georgian Dream officials. Some versions suggested Garibashvili sought help or asylum from embassies. Why has he been targeted, especially after publicly distancing himself from politics?
A: Bidzina Ivanishvili [the GD founder and honorary chair] enjoys serial-like intrigues in internal politics, where he later appears as the peacemaker. That’s part of his psychological profile. It’s also understandable that some figures try to impress Ivanishvili by discrediting others - this fits his political playbook. In this case, the main issue is [Prime Minister Irakli] Kobakhidze’s interest in eliminating anyone who could be seen as his potential replacement.
There is a model in which only one “idol” figure must remain for Ivanishvili to consider, and Kobakhidze wants to ensure that is him. Garibashvili might genuinely have no interest in politics anymore and simply want to live a peaceful life, but he still enjoys real sympathy among Georgian Dream supporters, which is alarming for Kobakhidze. Kobakhidze knows people may flatter him now, but he lacks deep-rooted support within the party and its electorate. In contrast, Garibashvili has more natural, emotional backing. Kobakhidze understands that if Ivanishvili tires of him, he could be removed as prime minister in an instant - as has happened with previous prime ministers. So, he believes eliminating potential rivals will secure his own position.
Q: However, this internal infighting seems to be creating dissatisfaction even among Georgian Dream supporters. We are seeing open statements from Garibashvili’s supporters. If, as you say, he enjoys wide sympathy among the electorate, doesn’t Kobakhidze see the risk to the party’s rating?
A: Although I personally find Kobakhidze the most unacceptable figure, I still respect him for his capabilities and resources. He is an intelligent and serious person. Precisely because he understands things well, he is trying to approach Garibashvili cautiously. If he decides to target him, he will try to justify it thoroughly, so that Garibashvili becomes discredited even among his own supporters. Before any possible arrest, he is laying the groundwork.
We are already seeing this attempt at reputational destruction. Interestingly, the recent arrests have not provoked protest even from radical opponents of the government. In this sense, Kobakhidze is playing a “win-win” game. The arrests of [former officials and GD associates] like Burchuladze, Kandelaki, and Zviadauri have been welcomed by both supporters and the opposition. The opposition only tries to frame it as a problem of the government as a whole.
Q: I want to ask about the planned 4 October protest and the possible scenarios. The opposition has been raising expectations, claiming this will be a day of major political change, even peaceful overthrow. How realistic are these expectations?
A: Any strategist planning a political battle does not reveal their cards in advance - otherwise the opponent would have time to prepare. What the opposition is doing now, raising expectations, is risky. It may serve to motivate their supporters, but we must consider several possible scenarios if events escalate. One scenario is a spontaneous uprising, where crowds self-organize without clear leadership - something we saw in Nepal. Another is a planned action led by influential groups and networks that mobilize the wider public. But this requires strong, respected leaders.
I don’t think a Nepal-style scenario will happen here. Although there is public antagonism toward the government, the intensity is not high enough. Also, there are no opposition leaders today with the authority or charisma that figures like Mikheil Saakashvili or Zurab Zhvania had. When they gave instructions, people followed them without question. Such leaders do not exist now, so this protest may end in disappointment, which would harm the opposition. We have already seen this with previous protests - for example, when [fifth] President Salome Zourabichvili appeared and nothing significant happened, people were left disillusioned.
Q: If this protest also fails, how could the government use it to its advantage?
A: It depends on how the events of 4 October unfold. If the authorities provoke incidents - which is possible - they could then use this as a pretext to crack down on the opposition. I view this cautiously, because we have seen in the past that the government struggles to fully control such situations using only police forces. If things escalate, they may resort to military involvement. If the situation becomes very tense, the government might use force to restore order, potentially declaring a state of emergency and launching mass arrests and persecution. Even then, they have no guarantee people will comply, but the authorities want this situation resolved and will try to find a pretext to use harsher measures.
By Elza Paposhvili
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Archil Gamzardia