US-Iran memorandum marks strategic win for Tehran, setback for Washington, analyst Antadze

The newly signed US-Iran memorandum represents a significant retreat by Washington and a strengthening of Iran's position, according to International Relations Analyst Giorgi Antadze in an interview with Front News. In his assessment, President Trump failed to achieve any of the strategic objectives announced before the conflict began, while domestic political pressures, China's role, and energy-related concerns ultimately pushed the White House toward substantial concessions.

Antadze argues that the agreement deals a serious blow to the United States' image in the Middle East. Arab states, he says, have seen that Washington cannot fully guarantee their security, while Israel has been left to face a new and challenging geopolitical reality created by its most important ally.

Q: At the outset of the conflict, President Trump demanded Iran's "unconditional surrender." However, the signed memorandum appears to place Iran in a winning position instead. How do you assess these developments, and who has emerged as the principal beneficiary of the agreement?

A: I fully agree with that assessment. If we compare Iran's situation before the war with the conditions outlined in this memorandum, Iran is clearly in a much more favorable position today. Prior to the conflict, Iran faced significant economic and financial restrictions, including limitations on its oil sector and broader sanctions. If this memorandum is ultimately implemented, Iran could see many of those restrictions removed.

The United States has failed to achieve any of the objectives it publicly declared before the war. We should recall President Trump's statements encouraging the Iranian people to rise up against the regime, as well as the stated goals regarding the destruction of Iran's military infrastructure. None of these objectives were fully achieved.

Based on the memorandum, the United States appears to have received only a verbal commitment from Iran that it will not pursue nuclear weapons. How future arrangements concerning Iran's nuclear program will evolve remains uncertain. Ultimately, through this memorandum, the United States has demonstrated how not to conduct a war when pursuing political objectives.

Q: In your view, what forced the White House and President Trump to make such substantial concessions? Was it economic pressure and rising fuel prices, or the geopolitical consequences associated with Iran's threat to close the Strait of Hormuz?

A: It was a combination of all the factors you mentioned. Each played an important role.

There were certainly economic considerations. In addition, the Iran issue was reportedly discussed during diplomatic engagements with China. It is highly likely that Beijing also encouraged a rapid resolution of the conflict in order to minimize the economic and energy-related consequences for China.

Domestic political considerations in the United States were also significant. According to preliminary polling, Republicans face challenges in the upcoming midterm elections. Prolonging the conflict and entering the election cycle under those circumstances would have made the situation even more difficult for both President Trump and the Republican Party.

All of these factors carried weight.

From a geopolitical perspective, however, strategic uncertainty in the Middle East remains. This agreement has not fundamentally transformed the security realities facing either Israel or the Arab states. What has become clearer to Arab countries is that the United States may not be able to provide absolute security guarantees, nor can it necessarily be relied upon to do so in every circumstance.

Q: Reports suggest that the agreement came as a surprise to Israeli officials and that they were excluded from the negotiations. Israel's ambassador to the United Nations even described the document as "very bad for Israel." How could this memorandum affect the US-Israel strategic alliance, and what does it mean for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has effectively built his political career around an uncompromising stance toward Iran?

A: The partnership between the United States and Israel will undoubtedly continue. However, as I have stated before, Israel views Iran as an existential threat.

The Iranian regime remains in power. Moreover, a more hardline leadership appears to have emerged, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has strengthened its position. At the same time, Israel now faces increased constraints regarding military actions connected to Iran's regional allies, particularly in Lebanon.

As a result, the security threats that Israel associates with Iran have not disappeared. Under these circumstances, Israel cannot be satisfied with the agreement, and the reaction we are seeing from Israeli officials is entirely understandable.

Q: Do you believe the United States will pressure Israel to step back from some of its objectives? In other words, do you rule out the possibility that Israel might reject or violate the memorandum?

A: The primary question at this stage is whether the agreement's provisions will actually be implemented. We first need to see whether the memorandum will translate into reality.

That said, Israel will ultimately have to accept the new circumstances. Israel cannot simply disregard the position of its most important ally, the United States.

Q: President Trump faces midterm elections this autumn, and support from influential Jewish communities in the United States has traditionally been politically important. Given that this memorandum has already generated criticism among many Jewish groups as well as within broader American political circles, what impact could it have on President Trump's approval ratings and the Republican Party's electoral prospects?

A: I believe the impact will be negative. The agreement is already becoming a significant source of criticism of both President Trump's foreign policy and that of the Republican Party more broadly.

For that reason, I expect it to have an adverse effect during the elections.

Q: Who within Iran is currently responsible for implementing this memorandum? Some observers argue that the agreement has strengthened the position of the country's new leadership, reportedly under the guidance of Mojtaba Khamenei. In your opinion, which side possesses the stronger domestic political support necessary to carry out the agreement?

A: It is difficult to determine precisely which political elites or individual figures are directly involved in these negotiations. However, the most likely scenario is that the principal actors are representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

We have witnessed the resignation of Iran's president, as well as statements suggesting that he was unable to control key processes. These developments indicate significant internal tensions and suggest that the Revolutionary Guard further consolidated its power during the conflict.

Therefore, it is difficult to say exactly whom the Americans are engaging with behind the scenes. What is clear, however, is that the Revolutionary Guard now exercises substantial influence over Iran's governance and is likely playing a central role in the negotiations.

Q: Finally, an official meeting is scheduled to take place in Switzerland on June 19. What do you expect to be the key "red lines" that each side will emphasize while negotiating a final agreement, particularly in order to present the outcome as a victory to domestic audiences?

A: For Iran, the most important achievement is the preservation of regime stability. Equally significant is the prospect of sanctions relief and the reopening of economic opportunities. The unfreezing of assets and the restoration of trade would represent major political victories for Tehran.

In exchange, Iran appears to be offering primarily political and verbal assurances. That is a narrative that can be presented relatively easily both domestically and internationally as a successful outcome.

This new reality will also affect Arab states, many of which may need to reassess elements of their foreign policy and strategic calculations.

For the United States, the central issue remains the nuclear file. Washington's priority will be establishing the strongest possible monitoring and verification mechanisms. Whether effective institutions and oversight structures can actually be created for this purpose remains an open question.

At this stage, however, I do not anticipate any radical changes beyond what has already been outlined.

By Elza Paposhvili