Analyst Chitadze: Georgia is first case where OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism was triggered over mass human rights violations

Analyst Nika Chitadze says the activation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Moscow Mechanism against Georgia is an unprecedented case in international practice when it comes to alleged mass human rights violations in a country not engaged in active warfare.

In an interview with Front News, Chitadze discussed the implications of the mechanism, rare precedents in international practice and the potential impact of growing Western pressure on the Georgian Government.

Q. How would you assess the activation of the Moscow Mechanism against Georgia? How often is this instrument used in international practice against countries that are not involved in active warfare?

A. Yes, this is probably the first precedent, because the Moscow Mechanism is usually applied to crimes committed during wartime. As for the court in The Hague, it considers three main crimes: first — crimes committed during wartime; second — genocide; and third — mass human rights violations. However, we also remember that this mechanism was activated against [Belarusian President] Alexander Lukashenko based on a lawsuit filed by Lithuania. Georgia is the first case where the mechanism has been activated from the perspective of mass human rights violations.

Q. Some OSCE member states did not support this report. In your opinion, what does this difference of opinion within the organisation indicate? Out of 57 countries, 31 did not support it and it is supported by only 23. As we know, the United States and France did not support it either.

A. First of all, regarding the OSCE, this commission acted on behalf of the OSCE, which is why it had the support of the majority of member states. However, we know that Turkmenistan, Russia and Belarus did not support it, which is not surprising. Here we are not talking about them actively opposing it — they simply did not support it and abstained, so to speak. It is true that the United States and France abstained and did not oppose the conclusion, but the OSCE would not have been able to operate without the consent of these countries themselves. The OSCE carried out its work and therefore had the mandate of the majority of its member states.

Q. The report calls for the repeal of the “transparency” and “family values” laws. Is there a clear boundary in European law between a country’s sovereign right to protect its identity and its international obligations? How realistic is the ruling party’s argument that these laws reflect the will of the people and that repealing them would contradict democratic principles — the implementation of the majority’s will?

A. The OSCE is calling for the repeal of these laws because its activities rely on two main directions. One is conflict resolution — there is a conflict resolution centre located in Vienna — and the second is democracy and human rights, with the main centre located in Warsaw. Naturally, both the OSCE and the United Nations are somewhat weaker when it comes to conflict resolution, but the OSCE is more successful in protecting human rights. Therefore, the OSCE understands that this law is not created for transparency and that it represents pressure on non-governmental organisations that hold different views.

There is actually no talk about family values. When they write about family values, how should this be enforced in practice? When more than 300 people are injured and their family members receive phone calls threatening them not to go out into the streets; when people are attacked and beaten at the entrances of their apartment buildings — this does not fit either Christian or family values. So many people are in prison — this is not Christian or family values. Similar laws are adopted by various authoritarian states. A clear example is the former Soviet Union, where supposedly life was very good.

Q. Some in the opposition talk about sanctions and referring the case to a court in The Hague, which you also mentioned. Does this have a legal basis and what leverage does the OSCE actually have to enforce these recommendations?

A. The point is that if the court in The Hague begins to study the issue, it can launch an investigation based on this OSCE conclusion. As for the OSCE itself, it cannot adopt a resolution, because there are 57 countries and if even one country opposes it and uses a veto, the resolution cannot be adopted. We know that Georgia has also been a member since 1992. In other words, the OSCE cannot adopt a resolution demanding that this conclusion must necessarily be transferred to the court in The Hague. However, if the court itself becomes interested or if one of the member states appeals and demands an investigation… That is why when 24 countries supported it, there is a reasonable expectation: if even one of them appeals to the court in The Hague, an investigation will begin. In the case of Lukashenko, we know that the prosecutor is already reviewing the issue. In the case of Belarus, one country filed the complaint against Lukashenko. That is why I say — even if one country files it, the investigation and examination will begin in the court in The Hague. Especially since this is not only about the OSCE — there is also a separate resolution adopted by the European Parliament.

Q. I also want to ask you about the European Parliament’s ninth resolution, which is very sharp and critical of the ruling party. Nevertheless, the authorities say “let them write whatever they want,” that it has no political significance inside the country and that it is a “lifeline” thrown to the opposition. What kind of external pressure might follow and what could it look like, considering the Government has withstood such pressure for years?

A. Of course, the authorities will not stand up now and say that they are facing serious problems. They continue playing to their voters, pretending nothing is happening. On the contrary, in every case they will say that the government is acting in the interests of the people. However, when sanctions were imposed against Imedi TV and POSTV, naturally they became worried — even [ruling party founder] Bidzina Ivanishvili came from Abastumani to calm them down. The problems will become even more serious if their accounts are frozen. If their cards are blocked — as Levan Murusidze [a member of the High Council of Justice] said, “What do I have to do with it, why was my card blocked?” In such cases, these conclusions and resolutions will become much more severe.

Q. How will this report affect relations between Georgia and the European Union if the authorities do not intend to implement these recommendations? On March 14, Prime Minister [Irakli] Kobakhidze said there may have been some violations that will be studied, but ultimately he called the resolution and report defamatory. How do you expect events to develop?

A. I do not think the West will make concessions, because that would be like giving a “green light” for human rights violations to continue. Rather, the ruling party will have to make concessions. This will happen gradually and step by step. For example, we see that they have already sat down for debates with part of the opposition. The Prime Minister also hinted that if there were violations, some things might be reconsidered.

Q. Do you expect this retreat could manifest itself in calling early elections and that Ivanishvili might openly enter politics again, as he has done before?

A. The problem is exactly when Ivanishvili gets involved — although he is already involved in political processes. Anything is possible, of course, but whether that would solve anything is difficult to say. Ivanishvili will not suddenly establish democracy.

Q. However, he mobilises his voters and has authority among supporters of the ruling party. Could he use this leverage if the situation with the West worsens further?

A. Yes, of course. I once heard a person say that they voted not for the ruling party but for Ivanishvili. This factor certainly exists.

Q. What kind of crisis would have to emerge for Ivanishvili to dismiss the Government or replace the Prime Minister?

A. De facto he can do all of that. If necessary, he will sacrifice anyone to save himself. However, even if he dismisses Kobakhidze, he will again bring in his own people — he will not offer the Government to the opposition. I also understand that it cannot be ruled out that Kobakhidze could be used as a “scapegoat” if necessary.

Q. Could relations with the US administration become decisive for Ivanishvili? Do you think he might make decisions after that?

A. Yes, that is possible. If Ivanishvili sees that nothing works anymore, he might dismantle this Government. However, at this stage I do not see that happening yet and I still think it does not suit him — he does not want it to appear that Kobakhidze and his team failed. We will see how events develop.